In this paper, I develop a simple model of consumer choice that demonstrates why a market with increasing returns may not converge to a winner-take-all outcome and can even support a "Long Tail" of small share products. Consumers choose products by first limiting their choice to a subset of options in order to satisfy product characteristic requirements or to reduce the information costs of their decision, and then selecting from this feasible set based on a combination of individual preferences and increasing returns to sales. The critical factor in determining the shape of the market share distribution is the distribution of feasible set sizes. In most cases, the resulting distribution of shares follows a power law. The implications of the model for market efficiency and predictability are also examined.
Introduction
Models of competition under increasing returns typically predict a winnertake-all outcome (e.g. Arthur, 1989; Arthur and Lane, 1993; Arthur, 1996) .
In reality, markets with positive feedbacks are often shared by multiple firms.
For example, while Microsoft Internet Explorer controls 75% of the web browser market, Firefox and Safari maintain 17% and 6% market shares respectively (Net Applications, 2008) . Despite the known cumulative advantages in product categories such as books, music and movies, these markets Lamberson: Localized Increasing Returns exhibit behavior that is vastly different from the predicted winner-take-all outcome; the market share distributions contain many products each of which are sold to a small number of people, but that in aggregate account for a large share of the market -a phenomenon popularly referred to as the Long Tail (Anderson, 2006; Brynjolfsson et al., 2006) . This discrepancy between model predictions and empirical reality results not from flaws in the theory, but rather from limitations of its scope. Increasing returns as modeled by Arthur (1989) apply to competition among technologies, such as the oft cited examples of the VHS versus Beta format war and early competition among nuclear reactor technologies (Arthur, 1990; Cowan, 1990) . In these examples a single technology did come to dominate the market as the theory predicts (VHS and light water reactors respectively). The same positive feedbacks that affect technology competitionnetwork externalities, increasing returns to scale, learning effects and social influence -also operate in competition among products or firms; however, this does not imply that the theory developed to explain technology competition can be translated directly to the context of product competition with positive feedbacks.
In this paper, I generalize the model of increasing returns in technology competition developed by Arthur (1989) to encompass a broader spectrum of competitive markets with increasing returns. This new model, which I call localized increasing returns, interpolates between previous models of increasing returnsà la Arthur (1989) and a Lancasterian spatial model of monopolistic Lamberson: Localized Increasing Returns competition (Lancaster, 1971) . The corresponding predicted market share distributions range from the winner-take-all outcome at the first extreme to a flat distribution at the second. In between these well understood extremes the model predicts a distribution of market shares that resembles a power law.
Highly skewed market share distributions have long been considered an empirical regularity (Sutton, 1997) , and power law distributions specifically have been observed in many product categories (Kohli and Sah, 2006 ). Anderson (2006) drew popular attention to the ubiquity of power law market share distributions under the name the Long Tail.
1 While many models generate power law distributions, most have been formulated in contexts other than economics (Mitzenmacher (2003) and Newman (2006) provide many examples). Those that address economic phenomena, such as the model of the distribution of firm sizes developed by Axtell (2001) , tend to give probabilistic descriptions of how the power law could arise without addressing the underlying economic mechanism that generates the corresponding probabilistic process. In this paper, I develop a highly stylized model founded on three existing strands of theory -increasing returns, Lancasterian models of monopolistic competition and behavioral decision making -that provides a plausible description of the microlevel economics that lead to the ubiquity 1 The term "long tail" is used in two different ways in the literature. Anderson (2006) uses Long Tail to refer to the many small share products common in some market share distributions. In statistics, a random variable with a long tailed distribution is especially likely to take on large values (e.g. a power law).
of this macrolevel pattern. I examine the implications of the model for the efficiency and predictability of markets and find that while markets with localized increasing returns are potentially inefficient and unpredictable, they are less so than those described by previous models of increasing returns.
The results closely match the experimental observations of Salganik et al. (2006) .
The Model
The basic model combines a Lancasterian spatial model with Arthur's (1989) model of increasing returns. Each product x is described by a point, also denoted by x, in a characteristics space A, and each consumer i has an ideal point p i in A. Consumers are assumed to demand only a single product and prefer those closer to their ideal point, where distance is measured by a function d.
2 In addition to individual preferences represented by the spatial model, consumers take into account the purchase decisions of other consumers by receiving increasing returns to sales. The resulting utility to consumer i of purchasing product x is
where α is a positive constant and n x (i) is the number of consumers that chose to purchase product x prior to consumer i.
This utility function differs from Arthur's (1989) only in the specification of a spatial model of underlying individual preferences, which Arthur take simply to be random. In what follows I refer to this choice model as global increasing returns, because increasing returns apply to all products, regardless of their location in the characteristics space. We know from Arthur (1989) that global increasing returns lead to a winner-take-all outcome with probability one and thus are incompatible with the observed patterns of market sharing. Moreover, Arthur's theorems are much more general. One can replace the term αn x (i) by any function f (n x (i)) such that f > > 0 and the winner-take-all conclusion still holds.
This model is reasonable for choices among technologies where an individual may prefer one technology to another, but ultimately all of the options are acceptable. However, consumers often have requirements for the goods that they purchase and are unwilling to consider products that do not meet those requirements. For example, a person shopping for a dishwasher would only consider those that fit under their kitchen counter. Many previous models feature consumers with heterogeneous purchasing thresholds; however, these thresholds typically operate in relation to price (e.g. Green and Wind, 1973; McFadden, 1986; Adner and Levinthal, 2001) . That is, a consumer will not consider a product that does not meet his or her requirements, regardless of its price. I extend this notion to operate in relation to popularity: a con-sumer will not consider a product that does not meet his or her requirements, regardless of its popularity.
To formalize these stipulations each consumer in the model has a feasible set of products F i , specified by the consumer's ideal point p i and a radius r i ∈ [0, ∞),
The radius of a consumer's feasible set corresponds to the specificity of her or his requirements. The first step in a consumer's decision is to eliminate all products not in their feasible set. In this sense the choice is localized in the characteristics space around the consumer's ideal product. If the feasible set is non-empty, the consumer chooses from among this set by selecting the product that maximizes the combination of increasing returns and personal preferences in equation (1). If no products meet the consumer's feasibility requirements, she or he does not make a purchase (or, equivalently, chooses to purchase an outside good). I call this choice model localized increasing returns.
The model can be equivalently formalized as a single stage decision process in which increasing returns apply only to products within the consumer's feasible set radius using the utility function
U i (outside good) = −r i .
This formulation makes the origin of the name localized increasing returns clear: increasing returns only apply locally around a consumer's ideal point in the characteristics space. In some markets it may be unreasonable to assume that consumers have or would often take an outside option. Such industries can be accommodated by assuming that the consumers' feasible set radii are sufficiently large so that no consumer's feasible set is 7
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This choice mechanism is supported by research in behavioral decision making that shows that consumers rarely consider all possible products when making a purchase decision unless there are very few options available. Instead, consumers often employ a combination of heuristics, first coarsely categorizing products as acceptable or unacceptable, and then selecting from the acceptable options based on a more costly heuristic (Simon, 1955; Einhorn, 1971; Payne, 1976; Payne et al., 1993) . The design of many Internet retail websites mimics this decision process; these sites allow customers to progressively narrow the field of options by specifying ranges of particular product characteristics and then display the remaining choices in order of popularity (e.g. Circuit City, 2008).
The Emergence of Market Structure
The model described in the previous section determines an individual consumer's purchase from among a set of products. I examine the market level consequences of these individual decisions by simulating the purchases of a population of consumers. For simplicity product characteristics are taken as given and there is no strategic action on the part of the firms. I do not model quality or price differences across products, and thus the model shows empty. Alternatively, one could assume that if no products meet a consumer's initial acceptability requirements, the consumer chooses the product closest to meeting those requirements (the product closest to the consumer's ideal point). This corresponds to simply dropping the outside option from the single stage utility formulation above. The results of the model under this alternative assumption do not differ significantly from those presented in the next section. At the beginning of the simulation a collection of products is drawn from a specified distribution. Then a sequence of simulated consumers chooses from among those products based on the choice model described above. In the base case, both product characteristics and consumer ideal points are uniformly distributed over each dimension of the characteristics space. Before examining the results of the full model, I consider two benchmark cases:
no increasing returns and global increasing returns. I then turn to the model of localized increasing returns and find that with a set of initial assumptions regarding consumers and products, shown in Table 1 , the model produces a power law distribution of firm sizes. I vary these parameter choices to determine which assumptions drive the result. The distribution of market shares continues to follow a power law for many, but not all, parameter choices. For example, increasing the consumers' feasible set radii concentrates the market among fewer firms. Conversely, decreasing the radii creates a more uniform distribution. 
Benchmark Models
The model is run 100 times with no increasing returns and with global increasing returns. All other parameters are as in Table 1 . 4 While the results from these simple models are not suprising, they will serve as useful benchmarks when I turn to the full model in subsequent sections. Figure 1 presents the resulting market share distribution from a representative run with no increasing returns in the left panels and with global increasing returns in the 4 The base case parameters, shown in Table 1 , are chosen to be as neutral as possible. The weight on increasing returns (α) only changes the speed with which the market reaches equilibrium. The number of consumers is sufficiently large so that the market shares are stable well before the simulation is complete. The two dimensional euclidean topology with boundary is computationally fast, and using a toroidal topology does not significantly change the results. The uniform distribution of consumer ideal points and product characteristics ensures that no particular product has a significant advantage a priori. The maximum feasible set radius is the smallest number for which it is possible that the entire characteristics space could be considered by a single consumer. A consumer with the minimum feasible set radius will only accept a product with characteristics that exactly match those of her or his ideal product. The minimum share of .001 is based on graphical examination of the rank/frequency plot in several of the base case simulations to determine the approximate range over which the data follow a power law (Clauset et al., 2007; Newman, 2006) . right panels. The panels in the top row show the market shares for all products that earned at least .001 of the market, ordered by market share. The panels in the bottom row display the rank/frequency plots on log − log scales and the maximum likelihood estimate of a power law fit to the data (Newman, 2006).
The first and third columns of Table 2 summarize the results. With no increasing returns consumers base their purchases on their individual preferences, choosing the product closest to their ideal point. As expected, the 100 products split the market roughly equally: the mean market share is .01, the mean maximum share is .03 and on average 99.7 products earn a market share greater than .001. Differences in product attributes cause slight variation in market share as some products are clustered more closely together, while others occupy less crowded areas of the attribute space. In the global increasing returns case a single product monopolizes the market: the mean maximum share from the 100 simulations is .96, and on average only 10.7
products earn a market share greater than .001. Which product comes to dominate the market depends largely on the preferences of consumers early in the simulation. 5 These results replicate the winner-take-all outcomes of previous studies of increasing returns (e.g. Arthur, 1994) .
The Base Case
I now turn to the results of the model under localized increasing returns. The simulation is run for the base case 100 times, and the center column of Table   2 presents the results. A stable (over time) and consistent (across simulation runs) market structure emerges. The mean market leader's share across the 100 simulation runs is .38 -much larger than the mean maximum share of 5 If D max is the maximum distance between any two points in the characteristics space, then all consumers will choose the same product once the best selling product has accumulated D max /α more sales than its nearest competitor. That one product will eventually accumulate such an advantage is guaranteed by the theory of random walks. Thus, only early adopters choose a product other than the eventual market leader. For the parameters used in this simulation the maximum distance between any two points is √ 200, and thus a single product is guaranteed to dominate the market once that product has at least √ 200/.1 = 141.4 more sales than the next most popular product. This also shows that the winner-take-all outcome with global increasing returns is independent of parameter choices such as the distribution of consumer ideal points or product characteristics. .03 with no increasing returns and significantly less than the mean maximum share of .96 observed under global increasing returns. On average 48.6 of the 100 products earned a share greater than or equal to .001, again placing the base case results between those obtained without increasing returns and with global increasing returns (99.7 and 10.7, respectively). Although in many ways the base case simulation results lie somewhere between the results obtained in the two benchmark models examined in the previous section, the outcome is not simply an average of the two extremes. Instead, the resulting distribution of market shares, as shown for a representative example in Figure   2 , resembles a power law.
6 Besides replicating the empirical observations of Kohli and Sah (2006) and Anderson (2006) , these results also closely resemble and may serve to explain the experimental results on consumer behavior with social influence obtained by Salganik et al. (2006) . I return to this point in Section 4.
To test the hypothesis that the resulting market shares follow a power law distribution, I fit a power law to the data using maximum likelihood (MLE) and test the goodness of fit with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test.
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The null hypothesis that the data are drawn from the power law distribution estimated using maximum likelihood cannot be rejected at the .1 significance level in 93 of the 100 simulations. 
Analysis of the Model
While some markets display power law like distributions of shares, not all do. Ideally, the model will reveal what characteristics of a market and of consumer demand are more or less likely to produce this phenomenon. To investigate this I vary six parameters of the model: four relating to the products and two relating to the consumers. In the former category I vary the number of products, the number of characteristics, the topology of the characteristics space, and the distribution of product characteristics. In the latter 7 Other commonly employed estimates of power law parameters and tests power law fit are known to biased, but the MLE-estimates and KS test have been shown to be reliable (Goldstein et al., 2004) 8 The minimum R 2 value from linear regression of the rank/frequency plot in these 100 simulations is .98. However, this is not a recommended measure for the goodness of fit of the power law, as it is known to be biased (Goldstein et al., 2004) . I report it here for comparison with the empirical examination of the power law fit undertaken by Kohli and Sah (2006) . In the 91 different product categories they examine, the R 2 value is greater than .95 in 78 and greater than .9 in 87. Contrary to many common statistical tests, in the KS test the inability to reject the null hypothesis at a higher significance level corresponds to stronger evidence of fit (see Conover, 1980; Press et al., 2002 ). The .1 significance level is the highest reported in the table published by Goldstein et al. (2004) Table 1 (KS statistic=.055).
category I vary the distribution of consumer ideal points and the distribution of feasible set radii. Table 1 . The column P≥min is the number of products obtaining a market share greater than or equal to .001. Normal distributions for consumer ideal points and product characteristics were truncated to lie in the interval [0, 10] . Distributions are for each dimension of the characteristics space. The following symbols indicate the level of significance p at which the null hypothesis (the data are drawn from the MLE-estimated power law distribution) can be rejected using the mean value of the KS statistic: = p < .1, * = p < .01, * * = p < .001. distributed normally, the distribution continues to be well approximated by a power law, regardless of the variance in those distributions. The results of the model are most sensitive to changes in the distribution of feasible set radii.
The Distribution of Feasible Set Sizes
The results of this model suggest that the distribution of feasible set sizes has a greater effect on the eventual market form than either the distribution of product characteristics or the distribution of consumer preferences. When the minimum feasible set radius is large (three or five), the top few products obtain a higher concentration of the market than in the maximum likelihood estimated power law distribution. The left panel of Figure 3 As shown in the right panel of Figure 3 , when the maximum feasible set radius is small, the distribution of shares looks similar to the results without increasing returns shown in the right panel of Figure 1 . In this case, where the maximum feasible set radius is one, the average consumer's feasible set contains only one product, and thus most consumers choose based on personal preferences alone.
In reality, feasibility set radii vary across consumers within an industry, and the distribution of radii varies across industries. (Johnson et al., 2004) .
the model with a small feasible set. In some industries, there may not be any consumers with a large feasible set. The phrase, "Give me the most popular car you've got," is likely a rarity in auto dealer showrooms. In other product markets, such as cell phones or portable music players, most consumers may simply want a product that works and works with those of others but have little knowledge of, or preference for, the underlying technologies. The results of the model indicate that this variation in the specificity of consumer requirements can have drastic consequences for market structure. 
Efficiency and Predictability
Previous research emphasizes that increasing returns lead to unpredictability and potentially to market inefficiency (Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Arthur, 1988; Watts and Hasker, 2006; Watts, 2007) . In this section I explore the extent to which markets with localized increasing returns exhibit these same qualities.
Efficiency
Scholars disagree about the empirical existence of market inefficiency in the presence of increasing returns; some argue that inferior technologies or products are never selected over superior ones (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1990 , 1995 , while others maintain that market outcomes under increasing returns are path dependent and may 'lock-in' to sub-optimal equilibria (David, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Cowan, 1990; Cowan and Gunby, 1996) . 11 Arthur (1989) demonstrates the theoretical potential for lock-in to inferior outcomes under global increasing returns, but markets with localized increasing may not suffer the same danger. In this section I explore that possibility.
One of the biggest challenges in assessing market efficiency is measuring product quality. To analyze the efficiency of the simulated markets in this paper, I follow the experimental design of Salganik et al. (2006) , who employ the correlation between market shares with and without social influence to measure market efficiency.
12 I run the model 100 times with a single set of products (with the base case assumptions on the distribution of product characteristics shown in Table 1 (2006) conduct an Internet-based experiment to examine the effect of social influence on consumer behavior. They compare the downloads of a collection of songs from a control group where individuals are given no information about other consumers' choices, and a treatment group, where individuals are shown each product's number of previous downloads. Downloads in the control condition indicate a product's inherent quality, whereas downloads in the treatment group reflect both quality and social influence. High correlations between the market shares of the control and treatment groups indicate more efficient markets. relation of market share with localized increasing returns and average market share without increasing returns is .72 and significant (at the .001 level).
Products highly ranked by individual preferences usually end up amongst the market leaders, and those that are ranked lowest nearly always do poorly.
For products in the middle the outcomes are much more variable. These results mirror those obtained experimentally by Salganik et al. (2006) .
The results with global increasing returns show a similar pattern, but one that is even more variable. Here the rank correlation of market share with global increasing returns and average market share without increasing returns is .59 and significant (at the .001 level). As with local increasing returns, the relationship appears to be strongest for the highest and lowest ranked products.
These results have implications for firm strategy in the presence of positive feedbacks. The literature on competition with increasing returns typically recommends strategies such as deep discounts or even giving away products early in the market evolution in order to build an installed base (Spence, 1981; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983, 2000; Arthur, 1996; Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Watts and Hasker, 2006; Farrell and Klemperer, 2006) . Less attention is given to consumer preferences because unpopular products may win out
by chance. This model shows that a more careful examination of the type of increasing returns operating is required. If most consumers only consider a small range of products, then despite the presence of positive feedbacks, consumer preferences for product characteristics will play a greater role in market success.
Unpredictability
Anecdotally markets with increasing returns are notoriously unpredictable (Gladwell, 2006; Watts, 2007) . However, empirically measuring unpredictability is difficult since history only runs once. The simulation approach allows me to examine the predictability of markets with localized increasing returns by running the simulation multiple times and examining the consistency of the outcomes. Using the same collection of 100 simulations each with no increasing returns, localized increasing returns and global increasing returns 
where m i,j is the market share of product i in repetition j. The total number of pairs of repetitions is 100 2
, so equation (3) simply gives the average difference in market share for product i over all pairs of repetitions. The unpredictability for each returns regime is the average over all products. Figure 5 shows the unpredictability under each of the three regimes.
Without increasing returns, any unpredictability results from randomness in consumer ideal points. After 10000 consumers, the effect of this randomness Figure 6: Unpredictability with localized increasing returns and different feasible set distributions along with no increasing returns and global increasing returns from 100 simulation runs. All differences are significant (p < .0001). Statistical significance is determined by bootstrapping.
on market shares is minimal. Localized and global increasing returns have higher levels of unpredictability. These results also mirror those obtained experimentally by Salganik et al. (2006) . In those experiments, unpredictability is significantly higher with social influence than without and is higher when social influence is stronger.
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As discussed above, by varying the distribution of consumer feasible set radii, localized increasing returns can interpolate between choice without increasing returns and global increasing returns. Similarly, the corresponding level of unpredictability moves from low values when feasible sets are small, 13 Salganik et al. (2006) have two social influence conditions, one in which they show subjects the number of previous purchases by other participants and a second in which subjects are shown the number of previous purchases and the options are listed in order by the number of previous purchases. 
Discussion
The model described in this paper extends the applicability of the theory of increasing returns from the narrow extreme of competition between technology standards to a broader range of product competition with positive feedbacks.
The model provides a plausible explanation for why markets with positive feedbacks are often shared by multiple firms, and more specifically why the distribution of market shares commonly follows a power law. Although many alternative models for generating power laws exist, the added value of this model derives from its specific description of the economic process that gives rise to the distribution and the model's foundation in developed economic theory. The simulated market share distributions fit a power law well, but whether or not the model exactly generates a power law is beside the point.
In many fields debate continues over exactly which skewed distribution a given set of empirical data fits (Clauset et al., 2007) . What matters more is that the model results resemble real market share distributions, which may or may not exactly follow a power law distribution, and that the theoretical underpinnings of the model agree with intuition, observation and established theory. The close correspondence between the simulation results and experimental outcomes with respect to efficiency and predictability support the model further.
The key feature of the model is the concept of limited feasible sets -beyond which consumers will not deviate regardless of product popularity. The results of the model depend crucially on the existence of a strict feasibility threshold, as opposed to a gradual decline in the strength of increasing returns as products become more distant from a consumer's ideal point in the characteristics space. Arthur (1989, Theorem III) shows that with any global positive increasing returns, regardless of how small they may be, the market will eventually converge to a winner-take-all outcome with probability one.
The existence of such thresholds in relation to price is a common feature of many models, and the extension of this concept to popularity is an intuitive one. The distribution of feasible set sizes proves to be the primary factor in determining the resulting market structure. By varying this distribution, the model interpolates between the winner-take-all outcome of global increas- Finally, the model provides a demand side argument as an alternative to the typical supply side explanations for highly skewed market share distributions. The exclusion of supply side dynamics from this model is not meant to deny their existence, but rather to illustrate that they are not necessary to generate these phenomena. Supply and demand side dynamics likely work in concert, and the inclusion of strategic action on the part of the firms is a natural extension of this work for future research.
